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Abstract
Traditional spatial equilibrium models have assumed that markets are either perfectly 
competitive or monopolistic. In this paper, a generalized spatial equilibrium model is developed 
which allows for any degree of market conduct from perfect competition to monopoly. The model 
incorporates a "dual structure" in which there are oligopolistic consignment sellers (producer 
marketing boards) and perfectly competitive producers receiving pooled returns.
The usefulness of the model is demonstrated using Kyushu regional milk market data in 
Japan. Numerous spatial equilibrium solutions are generated for the Kyushu milk market assuming 
alternative sets of imperfectly competitive behavior with the "dual structure." It is demonstrated that 
actual interregional milk movements in Japan are better explained by the dual structure imperfect 
spatial competition model than perfectly competitive or monopolistic spatial competition models. 
The model solutions generated by the imperfect spatial competition model are useful for analyzing 
alternative milk marketing organization policies.
Introduction
Spatial equilibrium models have been used frequently to analyze interregional competition 
problems. Interregional competition issues associated with dairy industries in several countries 
including Japan have been examined with these models (e.g., Sasaki; Kobayashi; Hayashi; 
McDowell; Rayner). Originally developed by Enke and Samuelson then refined by Takayama and 
Judge, spatial price equilibrium models have assumed that markets are either perfectly competitive or
2that they’re completely monopolistic. However, the structure of dairy markets in most countries are 
often neither. Therefore, a more plausible model for analyzing interregional milk movements would 
be a spatial imperfect competition equilibrium model.
The purpose of this paper is to present a generalization of Takayama and Judge’s spatial 
equilibrium model that allows for the incorporation of any degree of market structure from perfect 
competition to monopoly. The usefulness of the model is demonstrated with an application to 
interregional milk movements in the Japanese dairy industry with solutions generated and compared 
for alternative scenarios regarding the degree of market competition.
The Japanese Dairy Industry
Dairy policy in Japan features a quota system in the manufacturing milk market to prevent 
excess milk production from occurring because of higher than competitive market prices. As a result, 
the Japanese dairy industry can be divided into three distinct markets: the fluid market,
manufacturing market within-payment quotas, and manufacturing market over-payment quotas. 
Prices in the manufacturing markets are set by the government based on a deficiency payment 
program. For manufacturing milk sold within-payment quotas, prefectural milk marketing boards 
(the consignment milk sellers for farmers) receive deficiency payments equal to the difference 
between the guaranteed price and the standard transaction price for manufacturing milk. Both prices 
are determined by the national government: the guaranteed price is based on milk production costs, 
while the standard transaction price is based on dairy product market conditions, and all buyers of 
manufacturing milk are required to pay this price. To discourage excess production, over-payment 
quota manufacturing milk receives the lower standard transaction price. Payment quotas for the
3guaranteed price are not given to individual producers, but to each prefectural milk marketing board. 
Individual producers are paid the prefecture-wide uniform pooled price (weighted average prices for 
milk sold in the fluid and manufacturing milk markets).
Given manufacturing milk prices determined by the government, discriminated price 
formation for fluid milk occurs through negotiations between each prefectural milk marketing board 
and the processors it supplies. Since the fluid milk market is more price inelastic than the 
manufacturing milk market, the fluid market has higher prices. The structure of the Japanese milk 
market includes an oligopolistic group of consignment milk sellers (prefectural milk marketing 
boards) who allocate milk to maximize sales revenues, and a large number of perfectly competitive 
producers who receive pooled returns (blend prices). We refer to this situation as a "dual structure" 
because dairy farmers are perfectly competitive in producing milk, while they are oligopolistic in 
selling it through their milk marketing boards. Previous spatial price equilibrium models have not 
accounted for this "dual structure" in the Japanese milk market.
Conceptual Model
Consider n milk producing and consuming regions with the geographical scope of producing 
Region i the same as consuming Region i. In each consuming region, there are three administratively 
different markets: the fluid milk market (FMMj), the manufacturing milk market within-payment 
quota (WPQj), and the manufacturing milk market over-payment quota (OPQi). Unit transportation 
cost for shipping raw milk from producing Region i to consuming Region j (Tjj) is assumed to be the 
same for both fluid and manufacturing milk.
Buyers of fluid milk in each consuming region are assumed to behave as price takers, which is 
reasonable since there are many fluid processors in Japan. Within-payment quota milk is traded at the
4fixed guaranteed price, FP1, and the quantity of milk is limited to the fixed-payment quota. Over­
payment quota milk is traded at the lower fixed standard transaction price, FP2, and it is assumed that 
the demand for this milk is perfectly elastic. It is also assumed that each region has a linear marginal 
raw milk cost function and a linear fluid demand function, with all functions known by all agents (or 
consignment sellers).
Milk producers in Region i consign their annual milk supply, FSj, to Agent i. Agent i's role is 
to allocate farmers' milk among the 3n markets to maximize sales revenues net of transportation 
costs. The following notation is used based for the variables described above:
Dj: quantity of milk demanded in fluid market j (j=l, 2,..., n),
FS,: quantity of raw milk supplied and consigned in Region i (i=l, 2,..., n),
PSj: marginal revenue net of transportation costs for each market for Region i (i=l, 2,..., n), 
Xy: quantity of raw milk shipped from Region i to market j (i=l, 2,..., n; j=l, 2,..., 3n),
Xj(n+j): quantity of raw milk shipped from Region i to the manufacturing milk market within- 
payment quotas (WPQj) (i=l, 2,..., n; j=l, 2,..., n),
Xi(2n+j): quantity of raw milk shipped from Region i to the manufacturing milk market over­
payment quotas (OPQj) (i=l, 2,..., n; j=l, 2,..., n),
PDj: demand price in the fluid market j (j=l, 2,..., n),
PPR: producer's pooled (blend) price in Region i (i=l, 2,..., n),
Dj=a.j-PjPDj: demand function in fluid market j (j=l, 2,..., n),
FSj=-Vj+r|iPPPi: marginal cost function for raw milk in Region i (i=l, 2, ..., n), where PPPj
means marginal cost.
5Ty: unit transportation cost of shipping raw milk from producing Region i to consuming 
Region j (i=l, 2 , n; j= l, 2 , 3n),
Qi: limited quantity (payment-quota) paid the differences between the guaranteed price (FP1) 
and the standard transaction price (FP2) (i=l, 2 , n),
SPji shadow price of the right to sell a unit of milk in the manufacturing milk market within- 
payment quotas (WPQj) (i=l, 2 , n),
Rj: total milk sales revenue net of transportation costs in Region i (i=l, 2 , n).
Using the above notation, Agent i's milk sales revenue maximization problem net of 
transportation costs can be expressed as:
(1) Max: Ri = Sj=,nPDjXij + 2j=1nFPlxXi(n+j) + Zj=]nFP2xX1(2n+j) - ^ " T y X *
Total revenue maximization problem for all n agents is expressed as:
(2) Max. Zi=,nRi.
Agent i's fluid sales revenue in market j (PDjXy) can be written as:
(3) PDjXy = [otj/pj - (l/pj)Dj]Xij
= [a/Pj - (l/p j)(Zi=1nXlj)]X1J 
= [(Xj/Pj - (l/Pj)(ZnViXmj + Xij)]Xij,
where m (m * i) indicates all agents other than i. When Agent i believes that a change in his fluid 
supply will cause changes in all other agents' fluid supply to market j, Agent i's "perceived" marginal 
fluid revenue in market j is:
(4) acPDjXyyaxij = [a/Pj - (i/Pj)Dj] - (i/pj)OEm#ix mj/axij + pxy
= PDj - (l/pjXrjj + l)Xy,
6where rij is Agent i's conjectural variation regarding changes in all other agents' fluid supply to market 
j caused by a change in Agent i's supply.
Using the relationship (4), the total revenue maximization problem for all n agents can be re­
specified as the following net social payoff maximization problem adjusted for imperfectly 
competitive markets (ANSP):
(5) Max: ANSP = Zj=1nJ [oc/Pj'  (l/Pj)Dj]dDj + nFPlxXi(n+J) + 24=1nZi=1nFP2xXi(a„.j)
- Xj=r s i=1n(l/pj)(rij + DJXijdXij - Zj=13nZi=1nTijXij
(6) s.t.Dj<Zi=rXij, for all j,
(7) Zi=inXi(n+j) < Qj, for all j,
(8) Zj=i3llXij < FSj, for alii,
(9) Dj > 0, Xij > 0, for all i and j.
The difference between ANSP in (5) and the net social payoff (NSP) in the conventional 
spatial competitive equilibrium model by Takayama and Judge is the term: - Zj=inZj=in(l/Pj)(ry + 
l)JXijdXij. When the market is perfectly competitive fry = -1), the term is zero and (5) is equal to the 
original Takayama and Judge model. When Coumot-Nash behavior is assumed (ry = 0), the term is 
equivalent to: - Lj=in£i=in(l/Pj)JXydXy, which is shown in Hashimoto's spatial Nash equilibrium 
model. Coumot-Nash behavior means that Agent i believes that the other agents will not change their 
supply in response to the agent's action.
Using the Lagrange function (L) with the multipliers, X, co, and 0 for the constraints (6), (7), 
and (8), respectively, the Kuhn-Tucker optimality'conditions for the maximization problem can be 
expressed as:
7(10) 9L/9Dj = otj/pj - (l/pj)Dj - 1 < 0, Dj OL/9Dj) =0, for all j,
(11) aL/aXij = -(l/pjXry + l)Xij - Tij + l  - 0 < 0, X1J(aL/aX1J)=0, for all i and j,
(12) aL/aXi(n+j) = FP1 - Tij - 0) - 0 < 0, Xi(n+j)(aL/aXi(n+j))=0, for all i and j,
(13) aL/aXi(2n+j) = FP2 - Ty - 0 <0, Xi(2n+j)(aL/aXi(2n+j))=0, for alii and j,
(14) aivax = Dj - I i=rXij < 0, X(aL/aX) = 0, for allj,
(15) aL/aco = Xi=inXi(n+j) - Qj < 0, (00173(0) = 0, forallj,
(16) 3L/30 = Zj=i3nXij - FSi < 0, 0 0 L/30) = 0, for all i.
The Lagrange multipliers (or dual variables), X, GO, and 0, measure the fluid demand price 
(PDj), the shadow price for the right to sell milk in the within-payment quota manufacturing market 
(SPj), and marginal revenue net of transportation costs for each market (PSi), respectively. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions represented by (11), (12), and (13) indicates that each agent must equalize 
marginal revenue net of transportation costs across all markets where it sells milk. The equilibrium 
values can be calculated by the quadratic programming model solution.
The term, (1/PjXry + l)Xjj, in (11) indicates the difference between the fluid demand price and 
Agent i's marginal revenue in market j. The greater the degree of market power by agents, the larger 
this difference. For example, in the case of perfect competition, the term becomes zero because ry = - 
1. On the other hand, the term becomes (l/Pj)Xy when Coumot-Nash behavior (ry = 0) is assumed. 
In this paper, Coumot-Nash behavior is assumed to illustrate the imperfect competition solution, and 
coalition among agents is treated as follows. To illustrate, consider Coumot-Nash Agent 1 whose 
"perceived" marginal revenue in fluid market j is PDj - (l/Pj)Xij. If Agent 1 forms a coalition with 
Agent 2, then marginal revenue for Agents 1 and 2's coalition is PDj - (l/Pj)(Xij + X2j). In the case of
8monopoly where Agent 1 forms a coalition with all other agents, marginal revenue for Agent 1 is PDj 
- (l/pj)(Xi=i"Xij). Because any agent can sell the consigned milk individually or in coalition with 
some other agents, as a price taker or according to Coumot-Nash behavior, many combinations of 
agents' marketing behavior can be simulated. A tableau formulation and description of the model is 
presented in Appendix 1.
To complete the model, individual farmers’ milk supply needs to be incorporated. Unlike the 
oligopolistic marketing behavior of agents, individual farmers' milk production is competitively 
determined. Producers in Region i, as price takers, determine their supply given the producer pooled 
price. That is, their production level is determined by equating marginal cost to the producer pooled 
price. Thus,
(17) PPPi = Rj/FSi for all i,
(18) FSi = -Vi + riiPPPi for alii.
In the comparative static equilibrium, FSi in (18) must be equal to FSj given in the above milk sales 
maximization problem. To solve the model, the following iterative solution process is used to find 
equilibrium values for FSj.
First, the quadratic programming model is used to generate equilibrium fluid milk prices and 
equilibrium quantities of milk shipments in the sales maximization problem expressed by (5) to (16), 
based on initial values for FSi and given patterns of behavior of agents in the oligopolistic milk 
market. Second, producer pooled prices are calculated in (17). Third, new values of FSj for the next 
iteration are computed based on the calculated producer pooled prices and marginal cost functions of 
producing regions, and the assumption that producers behave as price takers in (18). Finally, the 
quadratic programming problem is solved again with new parameter values for FSi to obtain new
9equilibrium fluid milk prices and quantities of milk shipments. This iteration process is continued 
until values for FSi become stationary. For a more detailed explanation of the solution procedures 
using a tableau format, see Appendix 2.
An Application of the Model to the Japanese Milk Market
This model is applied to the Kyushu area of Japan as a case study. Region 1 includes 
Fukuoka, Saga, and Nagasaki prefectures, Region 2 is the Kumamoto prefecture, Region 3 is the Oita 
prefecture, and Region 4 includes Miyazaki and Kagoshima prefectures.
Based on the long run price elasticity of Kyushu milk supply by Ito (0.429), the Kyushu fluid 
demand price elasticity by Suzuki and Kobayashi (-0.77), and the regional price and quantity 
observations in Table 1, the linear marginal cost and fluid milk demand functions for each region are:
FSi = 135.162+ 0.967PPP,, D, = 361.434 - 1.438PDj,
FS2 = 118.078 + 0.832PPP2, D2 = 181.071 - 0.666PD2,
FS3 = 43.490 + 0.293PPP3, D3 = 88.146 - 0.324PD3,
FS4= 119.121 + 0.874PPP4, D4 = 163.371 - 0.639PD4,
where FSi and Dj are measured by thousand tons, and PPPi and PDj are measured by yen/kg. Unit 
transportation costs, Ty, are: Ti2=T2]=4.58, Ti3=T3i=3.95, T)4=T4i=7.80, T23=T32=4.71,
T24=T42=6.11, and T34=T43=6.00 yen/kg. Because little milk is traded between Kyushu and other 
regions of Japan, this milk is treated as exogenous to simplify the model. Payment quotas Qi for the 
four regions are: Qi=34.0, Q2=32.9, Q3=8.1, and Q4=39.1 thousand tons. The fixed guaranteed price 
for within-payment quota is FP1 = 79.83 yen/kg, and the fixed standard transaction price for over­
payment quota is FP2 = 67.25 yen/kg.
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To demonstrate how solutions vary based on market structure assumption, the model is solved 
for perfect competition, monopoly, and imperfect competition scenarios. To represent the perfectly 
competitive solution, the model is solved assuming that the four agents are all price takers. For the 
monopoly solution, the model is solved with the assumption that there is a coalition of four agents. 
To represent imperfect competition, 15 separate combinations with price takers and Coumot-Nash 
players are solved. In the first case, the four agents are all individual Coumot-Nash players (Coumot- 
Nash equilibrium). In the next cases, one agent is a price taker and the other three are individual 
Coumot-Nash players thereby creating four combinations of market structure. For cases six to 11, 
two agents are price takers and the other two are individual Coumot-Nash players thereby creating six 
new combinations of market strueture.-Finally, in the last four cases, three agents are price takers and 
the other one is a Coumot-Nash player thereby creating four combinations. Although there are other 
combinations with coalitions, they are not analyzed since the purpose here is to simply demonstrate 
examples of imperfectly competitive solutions.
The “dual structure” spatial perfect competition solution is shown in Table 2. In this case, 
virtually all raw milk is allocated to the fluid market, except for a trivial amount shipped to the 
within-payment quota manufacturing milk market in Region 4. There is also only a small amount of 
interregional shipments of fluid milk, mostly to Region 1. The amount of milk allocated to the fluid 
market in the perfect competition solution is substantially higher than the actual amount allocated (see 
Table 1). This is due to the assumption that agents act as price takers, which results in equality of 
price across markets net of transportation costs instead of equality across markets of “perceived” 
marginal revenue net of transportation costs. Consequently, fluid milk prices and producer pooled 
prices in the perfect competition case are much lower than actual levels.
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The “dual structure” spatial monopoly solution is shown in Table 3. In this case, the 
allocation of raw milk to the fluid market is roughly one-half of the amount allocated under perfect 
competition, and also less than actual levels (Table 1). Instead, the monopoly solution allocates 
significant amounts of raw milk to the within- and over-payment quota manufacturing milk markets. 
The model predicts no interregional shipment of milk in all three markets. Because the own price 
elasticity of fluid milk demand is inelastic, restricting allocations to the fluid milk market results in 
higher pooled returns to farmers. In fact, producer pooled prices under monopoly are 30 percent 
higher than the perfect competition case, as well as 10 percent higher than actual prices. It should be 
noted that the monopoly distribution of pooled returns to farmers is based on the assumption that the 
difference in producer pooled price among regions is the same as the differentials generated in the 
perfect competition solution. Alternatively, one national producer pooled price for all regions could 
have been allocated. It should also be noted that total milk supply is largest in monopoly equilibrium 
under the "dual structure." Unless agents have power to control supply, individual producers increase 
milk supply as higher blend prices are given. Real monopoly rents cannot be realized under the "dual 
structure."
The Coumot-Nash equilibrium is shown in Table 4. The regional fluid milk and producer 
pooled prices in this solution are the closest to actual prices for the four regions (Table 1). Not 
surprisingly, the allocation of raw milk among the three markets in this case is somewhere between 
the perfect competition and monopoly cases. Unlike the two previous cases, however, the Coumot- 
Nash equilibrium solution results in the same two regions shipping milk to each other, e.g., Region 2 
ships 51,400 tons of fluid milk to Region 1, and Region 1 ships 29,500 tons of fluid milk to Region 2.
While these shipping patterns are unintuitive, they do occur in reality as is clear from Table 1. The
12
other two spatial competition models did not predict these interregional milk shipment patterns. This 
suggests that the current complicated interregional milk movements may be caused by imperfectly 
competitive behavior.
Compared with the other imperfect competition cases where at least one region is assumed to 
be a price taker (an example is given in Table 5), fluid and producer pooled prices in the Coumot- 
Nash equilibrium solution in Table 4 are closer to actual prices. Price takers' returns tend to be 
greater than Coumot-Nash players when both price takers and Coumot-Nash players exist as is shown 
in Table 5. This is because Coumot-Nash agents try to keep fluid milk prices higher based on their 
"perceived" marginal revenues, and price takers obtain benefits by moving their milk to the fluid milk 
markets. In this case, acting as a price taker is like "cheating" in a cartel agreement.
Conclusion
The traditional spatial equilibrium model assumes that market structure is either perfectly 
competitive or monopolistic. In this paper, a new, generalized "dual structure" spatial imperfect 
competition equilibrium model was developed which incorporates any degree of market structure 
from perfect competition to monopoly. The model, which was applied to the Japanese milk market as 
a case study, incorporated a "dual structure" in which there are oligopolistic consignment sellers and 
many perfectly competitive small-scale producers with pooled returns given.
Using the model, many spatial equilibrium solutions in the Japanese milk market were 
demonstrated assuming alternative sets of imperfectly competitive behavior with the "dual structure."
The results indicate that under perfect competition, most milk was shipped to fluid markets, and 
there were very few interregional milk movements and much lower milk prices than actual price
13
levels. Under monopoly, much less milk was shipped to fluid markets, there was no interregional 
milk movement, and milk prices were much higher than the perfect competition solution and actual 
price levels. The Coumot-Nash equilibrium solutions were the most similar to actual observations, 
and the actual interregional milk movements could be explained by assuming imperfectly competitive 
behavior.
14
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Table 1. Observations in 1989 (unit: 1,000 tons and yen/kg)
\To Fluid Milk Market Manufacturing Milk Market Total
From\ (Within Quota) (Over Quota)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 128.4 19.1 12.0 1.7 34.0 0 0 0 10.9 0 0 0 206.1
2 33.1 74.7 1.5 1.6 0 32.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 143.8
3 31.4 0 34.3 0 0 0 8.1 0 0 0 1.2 0 75.1
4 11.3 8.5 2.0 89.0 0 0 0 39.1 0 0 0 8.3 158.0
Total 204.2 102.3 49.8 92.3 34.0 32.9 8.1 39.1 10.9 0 1.2 8.3 583.0
Region 
i or j Fluid Milk Price 
PDi
Producer's 
Pooled Price 
PPPi
1 109.35 101.62
2 118.22 103.21
3 118.22 107.75
4 111.20 99.07
Average 112.74 102.11
Source: Suzuki and Kobayashi.
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Table 2. "Dual-Structure" Spatial Perfect Competition Equilibrium (unit: 1,000 tons and yen/kg)
\To
From\
Fluid Milk Market 
1 2 3 4
Manufacturing Milk Market 
(Within Quota)
1 2  3 4
(Over Quota)
1 2 3 4
Total
1 193.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 193.2
2 4.8 125.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 130.5
3 7.0 0 61.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68.0
4 30.5 0 0 112.4 0 0 0 1.4 0 0 0 0 144.3
Total 235.4 125.8 61.0 112.4 0 0 0 1.4 0 0 0 0 536.0
Region Agent's Marginal Producer's
i or j Fluid Milk Price Revenue3 Pooled Price*5
PDi PSi PPR
1 87.63 87.63 88.23
2 83.05 83.05 87.19
3 83.68 83.68 83.68
4 79.83 79.83 83.32
Average 84.46 84.46 86.07
aPSj is Agent i's "perceived" marginal revenue (net of transportation costs) equalized in each market 
(marginal revenue = market price in perfect competition) (Same in Tables 3 to 5). 
bExogenously given milk shipments from each region to the outside of Kyushu are taken into account 
in calculating PPPj (Same in tables 3 to 5).
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Table 3. "Dual-Structure" Spatial Monopoly Equilibrium (unit: 1,000 tons and yen/kg)
\To
From\
Fluid Milk Market 
1 2 3 4
Manufacturing Milk Market 
(Within Quota)
1 2  3 4
(Over Quota) 
1 2 3
Total
4
1 132.4 0 0 0 34.0 0 0 0 51.8 0 0 0 218.1
2 0 68.1 0 0 0 32.9 0 0 0 50.9 0 0 152.0
3 0 0 33.2 0 0 0 8.1 0 0 0 34.3 0 75.6
4 0 0 0 60.2 0 0 0 39.1 0 0 0 67.5 166.8
Total 132.4 68.1 33.2 60.2 34.0 32.9 8.1 39.1 51.8 50.9 34.3 67.5 612.5
Region 
i or j
Agent’s Marginal 
Fluid Milk Price Revenue
Producer's 
Pooled Price8
PD, PS, PPP;
1 159.30 67.25 114.03
2 169.56 67.25 112.99
3 169.65 67.25 109.48
4 161.46 67.25 109.13
Average 163.29 67.25 111.87
“Estimated PPP differentials in the perfect competition equilibrium in Table 2 are used to allocate 
monopoly pooled returns and to calculate PPP; of each region.
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Table 4. "Dual-Structure" Spatial Coumot-Nash Equilibrium (unit: 1,000 tons and yen/kg)
\To Fluid Milk Market Manufacturing Milk Market Total
From\ (Within Quota) (Over Quota)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 64.6 29.5 14.5 24.7 34.0 6.6 8.1 0 20.5 0 0 0 202.6
2 51.4 29.5 12.8 22.9 0 26.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 142.9
3 33.5 17.6 10.1 14.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75.7
4 50.6 27.2 13.2 28.5 0 0 0 39.1 0 0 0 0 158.6
Total 200.1 103.8 50.6 90.7 34.0 32.9 8.1 39.1 20.5 0 0 0 579.7
Region Agent's Marginal Producer’s
io rj Fluid Milk Price Revenue Pooled Price
PDj_______________PSj_________ PPPi
1 112.18 67.25 97.94
2 116.10 71.83 102.09
3 115.99 84.96 109.91
4 113.76 69.20 99.70
Average 113.85 70.73 100.89
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Table 5. "Dual-Structure" Spatial Equilibrium in the Case Where Agent 1 is a Price taker and the 
Others are Individual Coumot-Nash Players (unit: 1,000 tons and yen/kg)
\To Fluid Milk Market Manufacturing Milk Market Total
From\ (Within Quota) (Over Quota)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 107.9 47.8 24.1 28.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 207.9
2 36.0 22.8 9.4 20.0 16.3 32.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 137.4
3 30.6 16.7 9.5 17.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74.0
4 36.0 20.9 10.0 26.0 13.0 0 8.1 39.1 0 0 0 0 153.0
Total 210.6 108.2 52.9 91.4 29.2 32.9 8.1 39.1 0 0 0 0 572.3
Region Agent's Marginal Producer's
i or j Fluid Milk Price Revenue Pooled Price
PDj_______________ PSi_________ PPPi
1 104.89 104.89 103.45
2 109.47 75.25 95.45
3 108.84 79.68 104.16
4 112.69 72.03 93.37
Average 107.95 88.60 98.43
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Appendix 1 The Quadratic Programming Model in Tableau Form
A convenient way to explain a quadratic programming model is using Tableau form. 
Appendix Table 1 briefly expresses the following concave quadratic programming problem. The 
problem is to find values for primal variables Xj (j=l, 2, s) and dual variables U,> 0 (i=l, 2, ..., r) 
which maximize the objective function F:
Max: F = Ij=is(cjXj-(l/2)WjXj2), 
subject to:
anXi+ai2X2+ ... +aisXs < bi ;Ui 
a2iXi+a22X2+ ... +a2sXs< b2 ;U2
ariXi+ar2X2+ ... +arsXs< br ;Ur 
wj.Xj > 0 (j=l, 2,... , s),
where ay, bi, Cj, and Wj (i=l, 2,..., r; j=l, 2,..., s) are constants.
The quadratic programming model in (5) to (16) in the text is expressed in quantity 
formulation with quantities as the primal variables. The model can be also expressed in price 
formulation with PDj, SPj, and PSj as primal variables. It is advantageous to solve the model under 
the price formulation because it is easier to solve computationally. The price formualtion using a 
tableau format defined in Appendix Table 1 is shown in Appendix Table 2.
The following vectors of constants are used in Appendix Table 2: a= (a i a 2 • • • a n) , 
p= (Pi P2 • • • Pn), FS=(FSi FS2 ... FSn), h=(l 1 ... 1) (the dimension is k), Q=(Qi Q2 ... Qn), 
T.j=(Tij T2j ... Tnj)' (j=l, 2,..., n), e=(l 1 ... 1)', where ' indicates transpose of a matrix. The following
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vectors of variables are used in Appendix Table 2: PD=(PDi PD2 ... PDn), PS=(PSi PS2 ... PSn), 
qj=(qij q2j ... qjcj) 0=1, 2, .... n), SP=(SPi SP2 ... SPn), X.j=(Xij X2J ... Xnj)' 0=1, 2, .... 3n), where qy 
(i= l, 2, ..., k) means the difference between PDj and marginal revenue of coalition i in market j 0=1, 
2 , ..., n), which is equal to (1/Pj)(ry + l)Xy in the relationship (11) and qy = (l/pj)Xy in the following 
cases where Coumot-Nash behavior is assumed. Ej is an nxn matrix, and any element of jth column 
is 1, but any element of ith (i*j) column is 0, where j= l, 2 ,..., n.
Ej = T o . o i o . o l  
I 0 . 010.0 I 
I 0 . 010.0  I 
L o . o 1 0 . 0J
---------- > jth column
I is an nxn identity (unit) matrix.
Coalition among agents can be expressed by matrix A. There are k (k < n) coalitions 
behaving as Coumot-Nash players. Any coalition may be composed of only one agent, but agents 
behaving as price takers do not belong to any coalitions. The patterns of behavior for agents in the 
oligopolistic milk market are summarized below by matrix A, which has n rows corresponding to 
each agent and k columns corresponding to each coalition. The element, Ay, of matrix A 
corresponding to the ith row and the jth column is either -1 or 0 ( i= l,2 ,..., n; j = l ,2 , ..., k). Ay is -1 if 
and only if Agent i belongs to coalition j, and Ay is 0 for any j if and only if Agent i behaves as a 
price taker.
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A = T An A12 ... Aik 1 -------^correspond to Agent 1
I A21 A22 ... A2k I ------^correspond to Agent 2
L Ani A„2 ••• A„k J ------ ^correspond to Agent n
: : : ------------------^correspond to coalition k
. -------------------------------^correspond to coalition 2
--------------------------------------^correspond to coalition 1
It should be noted that if all agents behave as price takers (the perfect competition case), then
k=0, matrix A has no columns, and is empty. If only one coalition is composed of all agents (the
monopoly case), then k = 1, and all elements of matrix A are -1. If all agents behave individually as
Coumot-Nash players, then k=n, all diagonal elements Ah are -1, and all other elements are 0.
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Appendix 2 The Solution Process for the "Dual Structure" Model for two Agents
[Step 1] Specify matrix A, values for payment quota Qi, Q2, and Qn, and initial values for 
FSi, FS2, and FSn. To illustrate, consider a simple case of n=2 as shown in Appendix Table 3. 
The n=2 case corresponds to the following matrix A:
A = T -1 0 1 = Al.
L 0-1 J
Matrix Al illustrates the case where there are two coalitions: one is composed of Agent 1, and the 
other is composed of Agent 2. In this instance, Agents 1 and 2 behave idividually as Coumot-Nash 
players. Another possibility is the case where there is a coalition composed of Agent 1, who behaves 
as a Coumot-Nash player, but Agent 2 behaves as a price taker. In this case, Al would be replaced by 
the following matrix A:
A = T-1 1 -A 2 .
L o j
In this case, the columns for variables q2i and q22 in Appendix Table 3 should be deleted. If Agents 1 
and 2 behave as price takers, then matrix A has no columns and is empty, therefore columns for 
variables qn, q2i, qi2, and q22 in Appendix Table 3 should be deleted. Another case would be where 
Agent 1 behaves in coalition with Agent 2 as a Coumot-Nash player. Under this situation, the 
following matrix A would be used:
A= T-1 I s  A3.
L - i J
This matrix shows that there is a coalition composed of Agents 1 and 2, therefore columns for 
variables q2i and q22 in Appendix Table 3 should be deleted, and also columns for variables qn and 
qi2 should be revised according to matrix A3.
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[Step 2] Solve the quadratic programming model to get equilibrium fluid milk demand prices 
PDj (j=l, 2, n) and equilibrium quantities of milk shipments Xjj (i=l, 2, n; j= l, 2, 3n)
corresponding to the given specification. To illustrate, consider the following smaller two-region 
example. In this case, there are two regions, and producers in producing Region 1 (2) consign their 
milk supply FS] (FS2) to Agent 1 (2). Agents 1 and 2 sell the consigned milk individually as 
Coumot-Nash players in six (=3x2) oligopolistic milk markets: FMMi (market 1), FMM2 (market 2), 
WPQi (market 3), WPQ2 (market 4), OPQi (market 5), and OPQ2 (market 6). Milk is traded in 
market 3 (4) at the fixed guaranteed price FP1 within the limit of payment quota Qi (Q2), and milk is 
also traded in markets 5 and 6 at the fixed standard transaction price FP2 without any limit of demand 
quantity. The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for the n=2 problem are the following: each agent’s 
opportunity costs moving a unit of milk from market to market (or marginal revenue net of 
transportation costs for each market) PSi and PS2 must satisfy the following conditions: 
X11+X12+X13+X14-1-X15-1-X16< FSi, (RES.)PSi=0.
X21+X22+X23+X24+X25+X26 < FS2, (RES.)PS2=0,
where (RES.) means the difference between the right and left hand sides of the corresponding 
inequality.
The fluid milk demand prices PDi and PD2 must satisfy the following: 
a i - p 1PD1< X n+X2i, (RES.)PDi=0.
{X2-P2PD2 < Xi2+X22» (RES.)PD2=0.
The differences qn, q2i, qn, and q22 must satisfy the following:
X n< Piq ii, (RES.)qn=0.
X21 < P1 q21, (RES.)q2i=0.
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X12 < p2qi2. (RES.)q12=0.
X22< p2q22, (RES.)q22=0.
The shadow prices SPi and SP2 must satisfy the following:
X13+X23 < Qi, (RES.)SP,=0.
X14+X24 < Q2, (RES.)SP2=0.
The shipment quantities Xu, X21, X12, and X22 must satisfy the following:
(PDi-qn)-PSi < Tn, (RES.)Xn=0.
(PDi-q2i)-PS2 < T21, (RES.)X2i=0.
(PD2-qi2)-PSi <Ti2, (RES.)Xi2=0.
(PD2-q22)-PS2 < T22, (RES.)X22=0.
The shipment quantities X13, X23, X14, and X24 must satisfy the following:
(FPl-SPi)-PS, <T „, (RES.)Xi3=0.
(FP1-SPi)-PS2<T2,, (RES.)X23=0.
(FP1-SP2)-PS, < T i2, (RES.)Xi4=0.
(FP1-SP2)-PS2<T22, (RES.)X24=0.
The shipment quantities X15, X25, Xi6, and X26 must satisfy the following:
FP2-PS, < T ,,( (RES.)Xi5=0.
FP2-PS2 <T2i, (RES.)X25=0.
FP2-PSi < T ,2, (RES.)Xi6=0.
FP2-PS2 < T22, (RES.)X26=0.
We can get the following relations between the optimal values for qy and Xy (i=l,2; j=l,2)
from the Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition for the problem.
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Xy < (3jcjij, (Pjqij-Xij)qij—0, Xy >0, qy >0,
Or more conveniently, using slack variables vy,
Xij+Vy = |3jqy, Vyqy = 0, Vy > 0, 
and therefore vyXy+vy2 = PjVyqy=0.
Thus, we get
Vij = 0, qy=(l/pj)Xy.
Let the total quantity of milk shipped from agents other than Agent i (coalition i) to market j 
be denoted by x. Then marginal revenue MRy of Agent i in market j can be written as follows. 
MRy=d([(aj/pj)-(l/pj)(Xy+x)]Xy)/dXy 
= [(0Cj/(3j)-( l/(3j)(Xy+x)]-( l/(3j)Xy 
=PDj-(l/pj)Xy,
where Xy is the quantity of milk shipped from Agent i to market j, equation PDj=(<Xj/|3j)-(l/|3j)Dj is the 
inverse demand function in market j, and i= l, 2; j= l, 2.
The difference between demand price PDj and the marginal revenue MRy is equal to (l/(3j)Xy 
and to the optimal value of qy, therefore MRy is equal to (PDj-qy).
The Kuhn-Tucker condition further shows the following relations: (a) MRy is not larger than 
the sum of Agent i's opportunity cost moving a unit of milk from market to market PSj and unit 
transportation costs Ty, and shipment quantity Xy can be positive if and only if MRy is equal to the 
sum of PSj and Ty; (b) shadow price SPj can be positive if and only if demand quantity in WPQj is 
equal to payment quota Qj, and a positive value of SPj means a premium for milk sold in WPQj, also, 
(FPl-SPj) is not larger than (PSj+Ty), and Xi(2+j) can be positive if and only if (FPl-SPj) is equal to
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(PSj+Tjj); and (c) FP2 is not larger than (PSj+Tjj), and Xi(4+j) can be positive if and only if FP2 is equal 
to (PSj+Tjj), where i=l, 2; j= l, 2.
All these and other relations derived from the Kuhn-Tucker condition show that we can get a 
static equilibrium solution which corresponds to the given specification by solving the n=2 problem. 
Similarly, we can get a static equilibrium solution which corresponds to the given general 
specification by solving the model in Appendix Table 2. It should be noted that in the general case, 
the following relations hold between optimal values of vectors qj and X.j (j=l, 2,..., n).
qj' = (l/Pj)(-A)'X.j or qj= (l/p j)X.j'(-A)
Based on this relation, we can show that the optimal value of qjj (i=l, 2, ..., k) is equal to the 
difference between demand price PDj and marginal revenue of coalition i in market j.
[Step 3] Calculate PPPj (i=l, 2,..., n), based on the equilibrium solution computed in Step 2.
[Step 4] Calculate the new "equilibrium" supply quantity FSj (i=l, 2, ..., n) of milk in each 
producing region with its marginal cost function (FSj=-Vi+r\jPPPj) and the value of PPPj calculated in 
Step 3 (the quantity FSj may be revised according to exogenously given trade conditions if necessary).
[Step 5] Compare the values of FSj calculated in Step 4 with the values of FSj currently given.
If max{ | the new FSj - the last FSj | ; i=l, 2, ..., n)} is not larger than some specified absolute 
stopping error, then stop computation and use the equilibrium solution computed in Step 2 as an 
equilibrium solution of the "dual structure" model. Otherwise, go to the next step.
[Step 6] Calculate FSj' = the last FSj + (l/2)(the new FSj - the last FSj) = (l/2)(the last FSj + 
the new FSj) (i=l, 2, ..., n) as the value of the "actual" supply quantity of milk in each producing 
region in the next iteration (it is assumed here that adjustment speed of milk supply is 0.5 per
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iteration), then replace the fixed value of FSi with the value of FSj' in the quadratic programming 
model, and go to Step 2.
Appendix Table 1. Expression Formula for Quadratic Programming Problem
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Appendix Table 2. Quadratic Programming Problem for the Japanese Milk Market (Price 
Formulation)
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Appendix Table 3. Quadratic Programming Problem (n = 2)
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